France’s financial-sector consultative committee is urging stronger protection for cryptoasset customers, including clearer service disclosures, tighter controls on offshore solicitation and greater security for information identifying holders. The CCSF recommendation, dated 10 November and published on 17 November, sets objectives for European policymakers. It does not itself amend the EU’s Markets in Crypto-Assets regulation, known as MiCA.

The committee wants platforms to distinguish the protection attached to individual services, rather than allowing their licence to imply that everything offered is covered. Its concerns include lending and staking. It also seeks stronger action against unauthorised offshore services targeting Europeans, while calling for security standards to guide unregulated entities holding information that identifies cryptoasset owners.

Existing European guidance already addresses misleading licence claims and attempts to disguise marketing as unsolicited customer contact. Comparing those safeguards with the committee’s recommendations shows why a new recommendation should not be presented as an enacted obligation.

A licence is not protection for every service

In a statement issued on 11 July 2025, the European Securities and Markets Authority warned that a provider’s regulated status could give customers misplaced confidence in unregulated products offered on the same platform. The authority linked that concern to firms’ obligations to treat clients fairly and ensure their communications are clear and not misleading.

Its practical guidance goes beyond a disclaimer buried in contractual terms. Customers should see whether a service is regulated throughout the sales process. Websites should distinguish regulated activities from other offerings, with corresponding differences in customer documentation. Firms should also make clear which legal entity supplies each product or service, rather than leaving that distinction to the small print.

ESMA additionally described a warning before access to unregulated services, requiring customers to confirm that they have read and acknowledged its unregulated status. Its statement identifies protections that may be absent, including regulated complaints handling, asset safeguards and ongoing supervision. These are specific supervisory expectations already published in 2025, not evidence that every platform has implemented them effectively.

The offshore question also has an existing operational test. ESMA’s February 2025 reverse-solicitation guidelines interpret a customer’s exclusive initiative narrowly. Whether the customer truly initiated contact is a factual question. A contractual declaration or disclaimer cannot override evidence that the firm solicited the business, so an acceptance checkbox alone does not establish eligibility for the exception.

Solicitation can occur through people acting for an overseas firm, including influencers. Payment or another benefit is a strong indication of that relationship, although its absence does not automatically settle the question. Conversely, genuinely independent reviews are treated differently when the firm did not know about, encourage, consent to or otherwise facilitate them. The distinction depends on the underlying relationship.

Timing matters too. The guidelines distinguish offers made during an original customer-initiated transaction from marketing further transactions a month later. Firms should retain records showing how the relationship began and whether the customer initiated interest in a new product. This existing framework limits the exception; it does not establish that the committee’s requested strengthening of enforcement powers has occurred.

Security requirements already have a legal baseline

For licensed providers, MiCA Article 68 already connects data security to the Digital Operational Resilience Act, or DORA. Providers must protect data confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability, review their arrangements and address deficiencies. Those duties are an existing baseline, rather than a November innovation.

DORA’s protection requirements translate that baseline into concrete controls. Access to information and technology assets must be limited to legitimate, approved functions. The regulation requires strong authentication arrangements and protection of cryptographic keys, with encryption informed by data classification and risk assessment. These controls address who can reach information, rather than simply whether a company holds a licence.

The regulation also requires protection against unauthorised access, data loss and risks arising from poor administration or human error. Its scope expressly includes authorised cryptoasset service providers. That defined scope matters when considering protection beyond licensed firms: an existing requirement for regulated providers should not be described as a new universal obligation covering every organisation that holds customer information.

Related coverage: France’s earlier MiCA reform proposals and ESMA’s client-money safeguards.