UK proposes new undersea infrastructure security laws

Britain is consulting on tougher penalties for interference with undersea infrastructure and new obligations for telecoms cable providers, in a proposed overhaul of laws protecting the country's international data connections and energy links. The White Paper, published on October 22, would also give ministers a tightly limited power to direct action during national security incidents.

The proposals are not law. The consultation runs until 11.59pm UK time on January 14, 2027, after which the government plans to publish its response and bring forward legislation when parliamentary time allows. There is no confirmed commencement date for the proposed offences or duties.

The government says subsea cables carry approximately 99% of the UK's international data traffic. Its paper also stresses that existing connectivity is resilient and that faults rarely cause noticeable disruption to internet or energy supplies. The consultation should therefore not be read as an announcement of an imminent outage.

Different offences, different thresholds

The criminal framework would cover telecommunications cables, electricity interconnectors and pipelines, including supporting infrastructure. It would address a security compromise caused by physical damage or non-physical interference. Proposed supplementary offences concern conduct such as obstructing repairs and failing to preserve relevant evidence, rather than treating every operational fault as a crime.

The suggested maximum prison terms depend on culpability: 14 years for intentional conduct, 10 years for reckless conduct and two years for gross negligence, alongside unlimited fines. Ministers are also asking whether the most serious cases need a higher maximum. These are proposed sentencing limits, not penalties already imposed under a new statute.

A separate question is how the offences should apply outside the UK's territorial sea, including cases involving a UK national or damage with significant effects inside the country. The paper also seeks views on making it easier for infrastructure owners to pursue civil claims for repair costs and other financial losses.

Provider duties and ministerial powers

The proposed security duties have a narrower focus than the criminal framework. They would apply to providers of subsea telecoms infrastructure serving the UK, requiring proportionate risk management, incident response and recovery. Providers would notify government and the appropriate regulator of compromises and inform directly affected users of significant risks.

Those user notifications would concern the entities directly served by a provider, rather than automatically becoming individual messages to every household using the internet. A designated regulator would oversee compliance. The government is also considering whether providers should register, so officials have a clearer picture of ownership and operational responsibilities.

Ministers want a separate national security power covering telecoms infrastructure providers and repair-service providers. Directions would be a last resort where existing regulation, commercial arrangements or voluntary cooperation could not reasonably deliver the required response. A specific compromise or threat, and a necessary and proportionate intervention, would be required.

The White Paper does not include subsea energy providers within that direction power; the government is considering their position separately. It expects the telecoms power to extend across the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland. Action beyond territorial waters would have to remain consistent with international law and involve cooperation with other states where necessary.

Proposed safeguards include keeping directions under review, explaining their reasons subject to national security exceptions, and consulting affected entities where reasonably practicable. Copies would be laid before Parliament, with exceptions protecting national security and commercial interests. Directions would need to specify when they take effect and allow a reasonable period for required action.

Sensing controls and the consultation deadline

The White Paper also proposes screening for fibre-optic sensing deployments and baseline protections for the data they generate. The government recognises their usefulness for infrastructure monitoring and environmental research, while identifying potential security risks. It proposes conditions on deployments where needed, with prohibition reserved for exceptional cases where other mitigation is insufficient.

Anyone with an interest can respond through the online questionnaire linked from the official consultation page. An accompanying survey seeks evidence on potential costs. Infrastructure operators, maritime and fishing organisations and sensing-technology providers are among the groups invited to contribute facts and reasoning, not simply express support or opposition.